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Abstract Imagery-based interpretive bias modification
(CBM-I) involves repeatedly imagining scenarios that are
initially ambiguous before being resolved as either positive
or negative in the last word/s. While the presence of such
ambiguity is assumed to be important to achieve change in
selective interpretation, it is also possible that the act of
repeatedly imagining positive or negative events could
produce such change in the absence of ambiguity. The
present study sought to examine whether the ambiguity in
imagery-based CBM-I is necessary to elicit change in
interpretive bias, or, if the emotional content of the imag-
ined scenarios is sufficient to produce such change. An
imagery-based CBM-I task was delivered to participants in
one of four conditions, where the valence of imagined
scenarios were either positive or negative, and the ambi-
guity of the scenario was either present (until the last word/
s) or the ambiguity was absent (emotional valence was
evident from the start). Results indicate that only those who
received scenarios in which the ambiguity was present
acquired an interpretive bias consistent with the emotional
valence of the scenarios, suggesting that the act of imag-
ining positive or negative events will only influence
patterns of interpretation when the emotional ambiguity is
a consistent feature.
Keywords Interpretive bias  Interpretive bias
modification  CBM-I  Imagery  Ambiguity
Introduction
The tendency to resolve ambiguous information in favour
of negative meanings is consistently implicated in the
aetiology and maintenance of anxiety and depression by
cognitive models of emotional pathology (e.g. Clark and
Beck 2010; Williams et al. 1997). Research seeking to
directly alter patterns of selective interpretation supports
the presence of a causal relationship between this cognitive
bias and emotional vulnerability. Such research has con-
sistently demonstrated that the reduction of interpretive
bias favouring negative resolutions of ambiguity also
reduces emotional vulnerability (cf. MacLeod and Math-
ews 2012). These promising experimental findings have
highlighted the possibility that cognitive bias modification
for interpretation (CBM-I) could potentially deliver applied
benefits in real-world settings.
Imagery-based CBM-I represents a relatively new
approach to traditional CBM-I techniques and is being
increasingly adopted as a means of altering selective
interpretation. Unlike traditional CBM-I approaches that
require the active resolution of ambiguous scenario content
(e.g. fragment completion), imagery-based CBM-I com-
monly involves auditory presentation of scenarios depict-
ing everyday events, requiring listeners to actively imagine
the situations described using a first person perspective
(Holmes and Mathews 2005). The scenarios are con-
structed such that they are initially emotionally ambiguous,
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with the emotional tone of the situation only becoming
apparent in the final word/s. An example of such a scenario
reads as follows, ‘‘You are jogging in the park when a dog
starts bounding towards you. As it gets closer you realise it
is quite aggressive/playful’’ (negative and positive resolu-
tion respectively; Holmes and Mathews 2005). Using this
methodology it has been demonstrated that repeated
exposure to positive imagery scenarios contributes to the
acquisition of a positive interpretive bias (Holmes et al.
2006), while repeated exposure to negative imagery sce-
narios contributes to the development of an interpretive
bias favouring negative resolutions of ambiguous material
(Holmes and Mathews 2005). Subsequent studies have
confirmed that imagery-based approaches to CBM-I are
capable of consistently modifying interpretive selectivity
(Lau et al. 2011). Furthermore, initial research with clini-
cally depressed populations has highlighted potential
applied value of these tasks for altering the problematic
patterns of interpretation which characterise depression
(Blackwell and Holmes 2010; Lang et al. 2012).
Given these encouraging findings with imagery-based
CBM-I, identifying the precise mechanisms that serve to
facilitate interpretive change is crucial to establishing the
most effective means of ameliorating biased interpretation
and emotional vulnerability. However, few studies have
sought to systematically investigate the way in which
imagery tasks serve to modify interpretive bias. The
rationale for achieving change in selective interpretation
via imagery-based CBM-I suggests that repeatedly pictur-
ing oneself in ambiguous scenarios that are then resolved
either positively or negatively will modify patterns of
biased interpretation regarding the expected outcome of
subsequent events. The result is that when novel ambigu-
ous information is encountered, the individual will apply
the same pattern of interpretation represented in the
imagery scenarios (e.g. Holmes et al. 2006; Lau et al.
2011). While this ambiguity resolution account of imagery-
based CBM-I is entirely plausible, an alternative, and as yet
untested possibility, is that the emotional valence of the
imagined scenarios could produce such change without the
necessary presence of ambiguity.
With imagery-based CBM-I it is assumed that the initial
ambiguity of scenarios and their subsequent resolution is
necessary for altering biased interpretation. However,
research suggests that imagery has the capacity to exert a
profound impact on emotion even in the absence of
ambiguity (Borkovec et al. 1993; Holmes and Hackmann
2004). Findings suggest that the ability to produce vivid
mental representations of emotionally negative or positive
events, can influence judgments about the likelihood that
these events will occur (Carroll 1978; Sherman et al. 1985).
It is possible therefore, that, regardless of its inherent
ambiguity, the act of repeatedly producing a vivid positive
or negative mental image of a situation could systemati-
cally bias interpretation in line with the emotional valence
of the imagined events.
Such a possibility has parallels with the theoretical
proposition originally proposed by Grey and Mathews
(2000) suggesting that repeated exposure to positive or
negative scenarios may result in a generic emotional
priming effect whereby subsequently encountered ambig-
uous information is interpreted in a valence-congruent
manner. This highlights the possibility that a training task
may exert an impact on measures of interpretive bias
without actually influencing the learning processes
involved in the resolution of ambiguity. Some prior
research has sought to examine this possibility in non-
imagery CBM-I methodologies. Such studies have com-
pared the acquisition of interpretive bias via ‘passive’
CBM-I training (involving reading complete scenarios) to
the acquisition of interpretive bias via ‘active’ CBM-I
training (involving the active resolution of scenarios;
Hoppitt et al. 2010a, b). These studies have produced
mixed results however, with one finding induced interpre-
tive bias effects only in the active condition (Hoppitt et al.
2010a) while the second found no effects of induced
interpretive bias for either active or passive training
(Hoppitt et al. 2010b).
Thus, with respect to imagery-based CBM-I, if ambiguity
is not necessary to modify biased interpretation and the
emotional valence of imagined scenarios alone can produce
measurable differences in interpretive bias, this would suggest
that the effects derived from imagery-based CBM-I may be
due to the type of emotion-congruent priming proposed by
Grey and Mathews (2000), rather than the systematic modi-
fication of a decision mechanism that directs the resolution of
emotional ambiguity. No research to date has sought to
establish if the emotional valence of imagery scenarios is
sufficient to modify patterns of biased interpretation.
The principal purpose of the current study was to
examine whether ambiguity in imagery-based CBM-I
stimuli is necessary to alter patterns of biased interpreta-
tion. Consistent with the rationale outlined above, it is
possible that the presence of initial ambiguity is not in fact
necessary for modifying interpretive bias and instead, mere
exposure to scenarios with emotional content is sufficient.
This view suggests that imagining positive scenarios
involving playful dogs (as per the example above) and
other consistently positive (or negative) situations will
produce measurable differences in interpretation bias
without any need for initial ambiguity. This we refer to as
the ‘Emotional Valence Account’ of imagery-based CBM-
I. Alternatively, it is possible that the emotional content of
imagined scenarios alone cannot change biased interpre-
tation. This instead suggests that the presence of emotional
ambiguity and its final resolution, is critical to modifying
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patterns of selective interpretation in imagery-based CBM-
I. According to this view no amount of imagining playful
dogs, sunshine, lollipops, rainbows or other positive (or
negative) events will influence biased interpretation unless
the description of these events also incorporates initial
ambiguity. This we refer to as the ‘Ambiguity Resolution
Account’ of imagery-based CBM-I.
To test these alternative accounts of interpretive bias
modification, the present study delivered four different
imagery scenario conditions. The same imagery scenarios
used by Holmes et al. (2006) were adapted into four dif-
ferent versions which varied according to the emotional
valence of the scenario and the presence of ambiguity in
the scenario. Participants therefore were exposed to either
positive or negative imagery scenarios (positive vs. nega-
tive scenario conditions respectively), where the ambiguity
was either present, such that the valence of the scenario
only became apparent in the final word/s (as per Holmes
et al. 2006, original task) or, the ambiguity was absent,
such that the emotional valence of the scenario was clear
from the beginning (ambiguity present vs. ambiguity
absent conditions respectively). Table 1 provides two
examples of the manner in which the scenarios were altered
to either preserve or remove emotional ambiguity.
To assess changes in biased interpretation, ten emotionally
ambiguous test scenarios were dispersed within the latter half
of the imagery task. These scenarios remained ambiguous in
that their emotional valence was not resolved. Two measures
assessed the interpretation imposed on these scenarios. The
first was participant’s emotionality ratings of the ambiguous
test scenarios (consistent with; Berna et al. 2011). The second
was derived from a subsequent recognition memory task in
which participants rated the similarity of positively and neg-
atively disambiguated versions of the ambiguous test sce-
narios (consistent with; Mathews and Mackintosh 2000).
If the emotional valence of the scenario alone is sufficient
to modify interpretation (consistent with the Emotional
Valence Account), then we would expect participants in
both the ambiguity present and ambiguity absent conditions
to adopt an interpretive bias in line with their allocated
scenario valence condition. Such a pattern of findings would
implicate the role of valence-congruent priming in the pat-
terns of acquired interpretive bias commonly observed with
imagery-based CBM-I. However, if scenario ambiguity is
critical to the acquisition of an interpretive bias in imagery-
based CBM-I (consistent with the Ambiguity Resolution
Account), then we would instead predict that only partici-
pants in the ambiguity present condition would acquire an
interpretive bias in line with the valence of the scenarios.
This instead would suggest that imagery-based CBM-I
exerts its influence on a more underlying decision mecha-
nism that informs the resolution of emotional ambiguity.
Method
Participants
To reduce the likelihood that participants had a strong
existing positive or negative interpretive bias, participant
selection was guided by initial screening of 840 first year
undergraduate students on the trait version of the Spiel-
berger State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T Spielberger
et al. 1983). Participants were considered eligible to par-
ticipate if their scores fell within the middle third of the
distribution (STAI-T = 36–44 inclusive). Of those eligi-
ble, the first 80 to accept an invitation to participate were
included in the study and were randomly assigned to one of
the four scenario conditions. The total sample comprised
26 male and 54 female participants with a mean age of
18.93 years (SD = 4.84). One-way analysis of variance
confirmed that participants did not significantly differ
across the four experimental groups in terms of age, STAI-
T score, or STAI-S (all F’s \ 1), assessed at time of test-
ing. Similarly, Chi square analysis revealed that gender
ratios did not differ significantly across the four conditions,
v2 (3, 78) = 1.65, p = .20. Mean age, STAI-T and gender
ratios for each condition are provided in Table 2.
Table 1 Example scenarios demonstrating alternate orders of emotional resolution in ambiguity present and ambiguity absent scenario con-
ditions (alternative emotional resolutions given in italics)
Ambiguity present Ambiguity absent
Beginning End Beginning End
E.g. 1 You have been to the dentists for a
filling to your back molar. You
have had a local anaesthetic but
after it wears off…
…you find you are in pain/
no pain
You find you are in pain/no
pain…
…when a local anaesthetic wears
off after having been to the
dentists for a filling to your back
molar
E.g. 2 You are skiing down a slalom
slope at high speed. You fall and
hear a crack
You realise that you have
broken a bone/ski
You realise that you have
broken your bone/ski
…when you fall and hear a crack.
You had been skiing down a
slalom slope at high speed




State and trait anxiety were assessed using the Spielberger
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.
1983). Each of the two subscales consists of 20 items, with
higher scores indicating higher levels of state (STAI-S)
or trait (STAI-T) anxiety. The STAI has demonstrated
validity and reliability across a range of populations
(Barnes et al. 2002). Current mood was assessed after the
completion of the emotional scenarios using a Visual
Analogue Mood Scale. This consisted of three positive
mood items (excited, happy, enthusiastic) and three nega-
tive mood items (distressed, irritable, and anxious) that
were each rated according to how the participant was
feeling at that moment from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
Items from these analogue mood scales were summed to
yield two composite scores for positive and negative mood.
The items: distressed, irritable, and anxious were therefore
summed to yield a negative affect score and the three
positive mood items: excited, happy, and enthusiastic were
summed to create a positive affect score.
Imagery Scenarios
Each experimental condition included 100 pre-recorded
auditory scenarios (110 including ambiguous test scenar-
ios) derived from those used by Holmes et al. (2006), and
adapted for Australian cultural norms. The type of situation
depicted in each scenario was identical across the four
conditions; however the scenarios differed in terms of
(1) emotional valence, and (2) the presence of emotional
ambiguity. Across the positive and negative scenario
valence conditions, the imagery scenarios differed only in
terms of single word/words which rendered the emotional
tone of the scenario either positive or negative respectively.
Across the two scenario ambiguity conditions, scenarios
differed only according to the presence of emotional
ambiguity. For the ambiguity present condition scenarios
were designed such they were initially ambiguous and this
was only resolved in the final word/s. Conversely, in the
ambiguity absent condition scenarios were constructed
such that the emotional tone of the situation was clear from
the beginning (see Table 1 for examples).
To assess the degree to which participants acquired an
interpretive bias in a manner consistent with the emotional
valence of the scenarios they were exposed to, ten emo-
tionally ambiguous test scenarios were presented, ran-
domly dispersed within the latter half (final 50) of the
imagery scenarios. Test scenarios were delivered in this
manner to disguise their purpose among the remainder of
the resolved training scenarios. The same ten emotionally
ambiguous test scenarios were included for all participants.
A number of these scenarios were adapted from those
previously employed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000).
These scenarios were emotionally ambiguous in that either
a positive or a negative resolution was possible on the basis
of the information provided, and no resolution of this
ambiguity was offered. An example of one such emotion-
ally ambiguous test scenario reads: ‘‘You are trying out
some new recipes you found and begin preparing a dish to
serve your family that night when your partner comes in
and makes a comment about the smell.’’ Participants could
therefore interpret the situation as having either a positive
outcome (the food smells delicious) or a negative outcome
(the food smells horrible). Two separate measures provided
an indication of the interpretation imposed on these sce-
narios. The first was the emotionality ratings completed
immediately after hearing the scenario, and the second was
derived from a subsequent recognition memory task.
Imagery Task
Digital recordings of all 110 scenarios were played aloud in
a male voice, each lasting approximately 10–13 s. These
were delivered stereophonically via headphones. Partici-
pants were instructed to close their eyes while listening to
the scenarios and, during the description, to imagine the
events depicted as if they were happening to themselves.
These instructions were consistent with those used in pre-
vious research to foster a first person perspective (Holmes
et al. 2006). A 3 s pause followed the presentation of each
scenario to allow participants to complete the mental image
of the situation depicted. To ensure that the two scenario
ambiguity conditions did not differentially influence how
Table 2 Participant gender,
mean age and STAI-T across
experimental groups
Standard deviations given in
parentheses
Experimental condition N Gender M/F Age (in years) STAI-T STAI-S
Ambiguity present
Positive 20 5/15 17.85 (1.50) 46.65 (3.87) 43.95 (5.32)
Negative 20 6/14 19.70 (5.49) 46.05 (4.10) 45.55 (4.71)
Ambiguity absent
Positive 20 9/11 19.40 (6.62) 45.91 (4.01) 43.40 (5.55)
Negative 20 6/14 18.75 (4.36) 46.10 (3.88) 44.75 (6.19)
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vividly the scenarios were imagined, or how emotional the
scenarios were, ratings of vividness and emotionality were
completed following each scenario presentation. Vividness
was rated on a five-point scale from 1, perfectly clear and
as vivid as normal vision, to 5, no image at all. Emotional
valence was rated on a nine-point scale from 1, extremely
unpleasant, to 9, extremely pleasant. Upon completion of
the ratings participants pressed the space bar to begin the
next scenario presentation.
Filler Task
A 5 min filler task was delivered between completion of
the imagery scenarios and the recognition memory test.
This comprised a short arithmetic task in which partici-
pants were presented with a string of three randomly
generated digits. On each trial participants were instructed
to respond to the parity of the majority of digits by pressing
the left mouse button when two of the three digits were
odd, and the right mouse button when two of the three
digits were even. Participant’s responses cleared the screen
and initiated the next trial. The number of trials completed
varied within the constraint that the task ran for 5 min.
Recognition Memory Task
The recognition memory test was designed to assess the
interpretations imposed on the ten emotionally ambiguous
test scenarios and was similar to that used by Mathews and
Mackintosh (2000). All participants received the same 20
recognition memory items, 10 of which related to the critical
emotionally ambiguous test scenarios and the remainder
related to 10 resolved imagery scenarios which were inclu-
ded to disguise the purpose of the task. For each recognition
memory item, participants were presented with a cue
regarding the content of the scenario (e.g. ‘‘Cooking a new
recipe’’) along with four different statements. These state-
ments included a possible positive disambiguation, a possi-
ble negative disambiguation, a positive foil, and a negative
foil. Foil items were included to confirm that participants
were not simply responding in a valence-congruent manner.
Each individual statement was rated according to its simi-
larity in meaning to the original corresponding scenario on a
four-point scale from 1, very similar in meaning, to 4, very
different in meaning. Example statements for the scenario
‘‘Cooking a new recipe’’ included: ‘‘When trying out a new
recipe your partner walks into the kitchen and says that the
food smells horrible’’(negative disambiguation); ‘‘When
trying out a new recipe your partner walks into the kitchen
and says that the food smells delicious’’ (positive disam-
biguation); ‘‘Your partner walks into the kitchen while
you’re trying out a new recipe and helps you out’’ (positive
foil); ‘‘Your partner walks into the kitchen while you’re
trying out a new recipe and disturbs you’’ (negative foil).
The order of these individual statements was randomised for
each participant, as was the order in which each individual
recognition memory item was presented.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were ran-
domised to one of the four imagery scenario conditions.
Questionnaires measures and all experimental tasks were
delivered on a PC with a high resolution 15 inch monitor
using E-Prime software (Version 2.0, Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Participants were seated at
the computer and wore headphones for the duration of the
experiment. All instructions were displayed on screen and
participants were encouraged to ask the experimenter for
clarification at any stage if required. Participants initially
completed demographic questions and the state and trait
versions of the STAI. Before beginning the imagery sce-
nario task participants were provided a description of what
was meant by using mental imagery. They were then given
two non-emotional practice scenarios and were asked to
imagine each situation in a first person manner, as if it were
happening to themselves. Participants were instructed to
close their eyes while listening to the scenarios to help
focus on the image. They then answered the subsequent
questions regarding how vividly they were able to picture
the scenario and how pleasant or unpleasant the situation
depicted was. Following delivery of the imagery scenarios,
participants completed the filler task, followed by the
recognition memory test. For the recognition memory test
participants were initially provided with an example item
(related to the imagery example used at the beginning of
the imagery task) to illustrate the task. Participants were
informed that no single statement necessarily reflected a
correct answer and that they should independently rate
each according to how similar they felt it was to the ori-
ginal scenario. At the conclusion of the study participants
were debrief and thanked for their participation.
Results
Examination of the data revealed that two participants failed
to provide responses for all the required tasks and were
therefore excluded from the final analysis. For all remaining
experimental measures, no outliers were observed three
standard deviations above or below the group mean, and
therefore no data were excluded on this basis.
Before addressing the key hypotheses under scrutiny,
vividness and emotionality ratings for the 100 experimental
scenarios (not including the ten ambiguous test scenarios)
were compared across the ambiguity present and ambiguity
124 Cogn Ther Res (2014) 38:120–131
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absent conditions to determine if there were any systematic
differences in these ratings that could potentially confound the
experimental manipulation. Reassuringly, mean vividness
ratings did not significantly differ between the ambiguity
present and ambiguity absent conditions, t(1, 76) = .70,
p = .487. Similarly, comparison of emotionality ratings
across the ambiguity present and ambiguity absent conditions
for the positive scenario condition, t(1, 37) = 1.63, p = .112,
and the negative scenario condition, t(1, 37) = .96, p = .342
did not reveal any significant group differences. This suggests
that the ambiguity manipulation did not produce systematic
differences in perceptions of either the vividness or emotional
intensity of the scenarios.
Assessing the Influence of Scenario Ambiguity
and Scenario Valence on the Acquisition of Interpretive
Bias
To address alternative accounts concerning whether the
emotional valence of imagery scenarios is sufficient to
produce change in interpretive bias (Emotional Valence
Account) or, if the resolution of ambiguity is critical in
order to achieve such interpretive change (Ambiguity
Resolution Account), data derived from the 10 ambiguous
test scenarios delivered in the latter half of the imagery task
were examined. In the following analyses we consider each
of the dependent measures derived from these ambiguous
test scenarios in turn. The first analyses examine the sim-
ilarity ratings from the recognition memory test, while the
subsequent analyses focus on the emotionality ratings of
the ambiguous test scenarios (completed during the imag-
ery task).
Recognition Memory Task
To assess whether participants acquired an interpretive bias in
line with their assigned valence condition, mean similarity
ratings of the positively disambiguated recognition memory
statements and the negatively disambiguated recognition
memory statements for the ten ambiguous test scenarios were
examined. These were subjected to a 2 9 2 9 2 mixed model
ANOVA with scenario valence condition (positive vs. nega-
tive) and scenario ambiguity condition (ambiguity present vs.
ambiguity absent) as between-subject factors, and recognition
memory statement valence (positive vs. negative) as the
within subject factor. If the resolution of ambiguity is not
necessary to achieve change in biased interpretation, as sug-
gested by the Emotional Valence Account, then we would
expect a significant two-way interaction between scenario
valence and recognition memory statement valence, not fur-
ther modified by scenario ambiguity condition. The nature
of this two-way interaction would be such that, participants
in the positive valence condition would rate positively
disambiguated statements as more familiar than negatively
disambiguated statements while those in the negative valence
condition would rate negatively disambiguated statements as
more familiar than the positively disambiguated statements
across both ambiguity conditions. Alternatively, the Ambi-
guity Resolution Account suggests that the presence of
ambiguity is critical to modifying interpretive bias and
therefore, a three-way interaction will be observed such that
the two-way interaction involving scenario valence and rec-
ognition memory statement described would only be evident
in the ambiguity present condition and not in the ambiguity
absent condition.
Consistent with the Ambiguity Resolution Account a sig-
nificant three-way interaction was indeed observed between
scenario valence condition, scenario ambiguity condition, and
recognition memory statement valence F(1, 74) = 8.79,
p = .004, gp
2 = .11. Examination of the component two-way
interactions for the two ambiguity conditions separately
revealed that the three-way interaction comprised a significant
two-way interaction in the ambiguity present condition F(1,
37) = 22.79, p \ .001, gp
2 = .38 (see Fig. 1), whereas this
interaction was non-significant in the ambiguity absent con-
dition F(1,37) \ 0.001, p = .997. As can be observed in
Fig. 1, for those in the ambiguity present condition, partici-
pants in the positive scenario condition rated the positively
disambiguated statements as more similar in meaning to the
original ambiguous test scenario, while those in the negative
scenario condition rated negatively disambiguated statements
as more similar in meaning to the original ambiguous test
scenario. While the direction of the effects was consistent with
each of the respective scenario valence conditions, a signifi-
cant difference between ratings for the positively and nega-
tively disambiguated statements was observed only for the
positive scenario condition t(1, 19) = 6.27, p \ .001, and not
the negative scenario condition t(1, 18) = 1.17, p = .256.
Thus, while the interaction is entirely consistent with the
acquisition of an interpretive bias in line with the valence
condition, examination of these component effects suggest
that this two way interaction was predominantly carried by a
pattern of acquired interpretive bias in the positive condition.
These findings also revealed no evidence in the ambiguity
absent condition that scenario valence exerted any impact on
recognition memory for positively and negatively disambig-
uated statements.
To confirm that these findings did indeed reflect the
acquisition of an interpretive bias in the ambiguity present
condition, and not a systematic response bias to positive or
negative statements more generally, similarity ratings for the
foil statements were included in a subsequent mixed model
ANOVA. This comprised a 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 ANOVA with
scenario valence condition (positive vs. negative) and sce-
nario ambiguity condition (ambiguity present vs. ambiguity
absent) as the between subjects factors, and recognition
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memory statement valence (positive vs. negative) and rec-
ognition memory statement type (disambiguated statement vs.
foil statement) as the within subject factors. If similarity rat-
ings represent a systematic response bias rather than a true
interpretive bias, we would expect no difference between the
pattern of similarity ratings of foil statements and disambig-
uated statements. This would be demonstrated in a significant
three-way interaction reflecting the same pattern of findings
described above, that was not modified further by the type of
recognition memory statement (disambiguated statement vs.
foil statement). However, if it were a true interpretive bias,
then, we would expect a significant four-way interaction,
comprising a significant three-way interaction for the disam-
biguated recognition memory statements only, and no three-
way interaction involving foil statements. Consistent with the
position that present findings represent the genuine acquisition
of an interpretive bias, a significant four-way interaction was
observed between scenario valence condition, scenario
ambiguity condition, type of recognition memory statement,
and valence of the recognition memory statement, F(1,
74) = 5.09, p = .027, gp
2 = .064. Examination of the com-
ponent three-way interactions revealed the significant inter-
action for the disambiguated recognition memory statements
described above F(1, 74) = 8.79, p \ .01, gp
2 = .11 and no
three-way interaction for the foil statements, F \ 1. Mean and
standard deviations for recognition memory ratings across
statement type (disambiguated test statements vs. foil),
statement valence (positive vs. negative), scenario ambiguity
condition (ambiguity present vs. ambiguity absent) and sce-
nario valence condition (positive vs. negative) are provided in
Table 3.
Emotional Valence Ratings
As an additional test of acquired interpretive bias, emotional
valence ratings of the ten ambiguous test scenarios were
examined in a 2 9 2 between subjects ANOVA, with
scenario valence condition (positive vs. negative) and sce-
nario ambiguity condition (ambiguity present vs. ambiguity
absent) as between-subject factors. If these data are consis-
tent with the pattern of findings observed on the recognition
memory task then we would expect a two-way interaction
between scenario valence condition and scenario ambiguity
condition such that different emotional valence ratings
would be evident across positive and negative valence
conditions in the ambiguity present condition only, and not
in the ambiguity absent condition. Results indicated a sig-
nificant two way interaction between scenario valence con-
dition and scenario ambiguity condition, F(1, 74) = 4.61,
p = .035, gp
2 = .059. As can be observed in Fig. 2, the
nature of this interaction was such that, for those in the
ambiguity present condition, exposure to the positive sce-
nario condition resulted in significantly more positive ratings
of ambiguous test scenarios as compared to those exposed to
the negative scenario condition t(1, 37) = 2.74, p = .009,
gp
2 = .17. However, for those in the ambiguity absent con-
dition no significant difference was observed in ratings of
emotional valence of ambiguous test scenarios across posi-
tive and negative valence conditions t(1, 37) = 0.08,
p = .940. Again, this pattern of findings is entirely consis-
tent with the acquisition of an interpretive bias in the
ambiguity present condition, which was not achieved in the
ambiguity absent condition in line with the Ambiguity
Resolution Account of interpretive bias acquisition.
Mood Ratings
Participants completed mood ratings immediately follow-
ing completion of the imagery task. The composite scores
for positive and negative mood were each included as a
dependent measure in separate analyses. A 2 9 2 mixed
model ANOVA involving the between subjects factors of
imagery valence condition (positive vs. negative) and
ambiguity (ambiguity present vs. ambiguity absent) did not
reveal any significant main effects or interactions for either
the positive mood scores (largest F = 2.93, smallest
p = .09) or the negative mood scores (largest F = 0.78,
smallest p = .38). This suggests that neither ambiguity
condition produced a systematic group difference in either
positive or negative mood across the positive and negative
valence conditions.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to determine whether the
presence of ambiguity in imagery scenarios is critical to
modifying biased interpretation, or, if the emotional
valence of imagery scenarios alone is sufficient to achieve




















Positive Disambiguation Negative Disambiguation
Fig. 1 Similarity ratings for positive and negative recognition
memory statements across positive and negative scenario conditions.
Lower scores represent greater similarity
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provides unequivocal support for the position that the
presence of initial ambiguity is indeed necessary to alter
patterns of selective interpretation. This finding was con-
sistent across both measures of interpretive bias acquisition
assessed in the present study. Results of the recognition
memory task revealed that those in the ambiguity present
condition adopted a pattern of selective interpretation that
was entirely consistent with the valence of the scenario
training condition to which they were allocated, with those
in the negative scenario condition rating negative disam-
biguations as more similar in meaning, and those in the
positive scenario condition rating positive disambiguations
as more similar in meaning to the ambiguous test scenarios.
By contrast, those in the ambiguity absent condition
showed no difference in the pattern of interpretive bias on
the recognition memory task. These results were mirrored
in the emotional valence ratings of the ambiguous test
scenarios where those in the ambiguity present condition
produced ratings that were entirely consistent with the
scenario valence condition to which they were allocated,
while those in the ambiguity absent condition who showed
no difference in their pattern of emotional valence ratings
across the different scenario valence conditions. This pat-
tern of findings highlights that only those in the ambiguity
present condition came to interpret novel ambiguous
information in a manner consistent with the emotional
valence of the scenarios they had imagined. Furthermore,
this strongly suggests that the modification of interpretive
bias via imagery-based CBM-I is not achieved by merely
imagining positive or negative events of any type. In fact,
these findings suggest that simply imagining positive or
negative events, in the absence of ambiguity, will have
little to no impact on the acquisition of selective interpre-
tation. Instead, the results of the present study underscore
the critical nature of ambiguity in modifying biased
interpretation.
The support for the Ambiguity Resolution Hypothesis in
the present study is consistent with the proposition that it is
necessary to alter implicit production rules concerning the
resolution of ambiguity in order to modify patterns of
biased interpretation. As originally highlighted by Grey
and Mathews (2000) interpretive bias can potentially be
acquired via different means. One possibility being that
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Fig. 2 Emotional valence ratings for ambiguous test scenarios across
positive and negative, and ambiguity present and ambiguity absent
imagery scenario conditions
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repeated processing of information of one valence will
increase the accessibility of such information and alter the
resolution of subsequently encountered ambiguous infor-
mation in a valence-congruent manner. Alternatively, it
may be necessary to acquire learning of a specific pro-
duction rule regarding the interpretation of ambiguity by
consistently activating alternative meanings which are then
resolved in favour of one emotional outcome. Consistent
with the latter account, the present findings clearly suggest
that the repeated processing of emotional information will
only serve to alter the resolution of novel ambiguous
material if such information initially activates alternative
emotional meanings (i.e. is ambiguous). Inconsistent with
the emotional priming perspective however, the present
findings suggest that the repeated processing of emotional
material that does not activate alternative emotional
meanings (i.e. is unambiguous) will not serve to alter the
resolution of subsequent ambiguous information. Thus
these findings clearly reinforce the position that to alter
patterns of selective interpretation, it is necessary for the
training material to activate competing alternative mean-
ings with the resolution then consistently favouring one
emotional outcome.
While the interaction involving the recognition memory
data demonstrated that interpretive bias was only modified
in the ambiguity present condition, it was also the case that
this effect was carried to a large extent by the positive
scenario condition. The findings revealed that there was a
significant difference in similarity ratings for positive and
negative recognition memory items in the positive scenario
condition but not the negative scenario condition. While
both the effects were in the expected direction these find-
ings clearly suggest that participants more readily acquired
an interpretive bias toward positive resolutions of ambi-
guity rather than negative resolutions of ambiguity. Other
studies have also revealed similar patterns of findings when
comparing CBM-I training for positive or negative reso-
lutions. One study found a substantially smaller training
effect for interpret negative as compared to the interpret
positive CBM-I condition (Salemink et al. 2010) while
another found only a trend in the interpret negative con-
dition compared to a significant effect in the interpret
positive condition (Salemink and van den Hout 2010). A
common feature of both the current study and these prior
studies is that they both incorporated non-clinical samples
(undergraduate) with mid-range trait anxiety. It is possible,
therefore, that amongst such samples participants have
relatively low, homogenous interpretive bias, and a greater
readiness to acquire a positive bias than to acquire a neg-
ative bias. However, with increasing evidence from both
CBM-I and other CBM techniques (e.g. Grafton et al.
2012) suggesting that the acquisition of a positive bias may
confer greater emotional resilience it is nevertheless
encouraging that individuals may show a greater readiness
to acquire such a positive bias.
The current pattern of data suggest that participants in
the positive condition may have acquired a bias in the
targeted direction to a greater degree than those in the
negative condition. However, it is worthy to note that any
consideration of change in patterns of interpretation in the
present study is necessarily speculative as baseline mea-
sures of selective interpretation were not included in the
current study and as a result, the magnitude of change in
bias cannot be compared. Given that some recent findings
suggest that individual differences in the readiness to alter
patterns of biased cognition may critically underpin chan-
ges in emotional vulnerability (Clarke et al. 2012), it would
be beneficial for future studies to also include baseline
measures of interpretation to allow more precise compari-
son of the magnitude of change in interpretive bias across
different conditions.
The measure of acquired interpretive bias incorporated
in the present study represents a common assessment
method for scenario-based CBM-I. It is also the case,
however, that this recognition memory assessment for
novel ambiguous scenarios closely resembles the training
task. Thus, the transfer of acquired interpretive bias as
demonstrated in the present study represents a ‘close’
transfer effect and conclusions about the generality of such
a bias are therefore limited. Similarly, the current study did
not seek to examine either the perseveration of the acquired
bias, or the impact on emotional reactions to real or con-
trived stressful experiences. It remains to be seen, there-
fore, whether the pattern of findings observed in the current
study will extend to other assessment tasks and whether
changes in emotional vulnerability will be consistent with
the changes in biased interpretation. To address the degree
of transfer of interpretive bias, future research could
incorporate alternative measures of biased interpretation
such as homograph priming, or homophone spelling to
assess the degree to which imagery-based CBM-I results in
such ‘far’ transfer effects. Additionally, lab-based stressor
tasks could be incorporated to examine if these CBM-I
techniques produce concurrent differences in emotional
vulnerability.
While the pattern of effects observed on measures of
selective interpretation were entirely consistent with the
Ambiguity Resolution Account of interpretive bias acquisi-
tion, the present study revealed no evidence of systematic
differences in mood across the four experimental conditions.
Although the absence of such effects permit confidence that
the observed patterns of interpretive bias are unlikely to
have been the product of mood state, the lack of mood
effects differs from some previous imagery-based CBM-I
studies (Holmes et al. 2006, 2009). However, it is apparent
that mood does not always change in a manner consistent
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with acquired interpretive bias following CBM-I with some
studies finding no evidence of changes in mood despite the
successful modification of interpretive bias (Salemink et al.
2007). The present study included baseline measures of state
anxiety using the STAI-S which suggested similarity in
these measures across groups. However, no analogue mood
scales were completed immediately prior to the CBM-I
training. Thus, while change in mood was not a primary
focus for the present study, to precisely establish the degree
to which the alternative CBM-I conditions produce change
in mood, it would be necessary for future studies to include
mood measures immediately before and after exposure to
the different scenario conditions.
While the ambiguity absent condition found no evidence
of interpretive bias acquisition, this very fact could, ironi-
cally suggest that this task may have useful applications in
future CBM-I research. The potential application of such a
task becomes evident when considering the utility of clo-
sely matched control conditions in CBM-I research, and
cognitive bias modification research more generally. An
ideal control condition should incorporate two critical
features. Firstly, it should not be capable of modifying the
mechanism that is the target of change in the comparative
experimental/treatment condition. Secondly, it should be as
closely matched in all other respects to the active condition
as possible. Research into the potential benefits of cogni-
tive bias modification is generally strengthened by high
quality non-treatment control conditions that incorporate
many of the same task characteristics as active training/
treatment conditions (MacLeod and Mathews 2012). The
quality of such control conditions is especially evident
when considering the comparatively poorly matched con-
trol conditions (such as waitlist) that are commonly
employed when examining the effectiveness of other psy-
chotherapeutic treatments (cf. Arch and Craske 2009).
Within CBM-I studies participants in active training tend to
be exclusively exposed to scenarios that are consistently
resolved in a positive manner while those in non-training
conditions receive half positive and half negative scenarios
(e.g. Hayes et al. 2010). While such a control condition is
unlikely to alter the target mechanism (i.e. biased inter-
pretation), the number of positive and negative scenarios
encountered in the active as compared to the control con-
dition represents a disparity. Ideally, to be as closely
matched as possible, a control condition would involve
exposure to the precise same emotional information, in a
manner that would not serve to modify interpretive bias. As
observed in the current study, the ambiguity absent con-
dition presented the same emotional content but showed no
evidence of being able to alter biased interpretation. Fur-
ther research and replication will obviously be required to
confirm that scenarios which remove ambiguity do not
modify interpretive bias. It is possible, however, that such
scenarios could potentially be utilised as a tightly matched
control for an CBM-I task where the same emotional
information is presented as an active training condition, but
in a manner that does not serve to modify the critical
interpretive bias targeted in the training condition. Such a
closely matched control could serve to increase confidence
that CBM-I tasks achieve change in emotional vulnerabil-
ity via alteration of specific patterns of selective interpre-
tation and not any more general exposure to emotionally
valenced stimuli.
While the current findings strongly suggest that ambi-
guity is important for altering biased interpretation, the
present study did not seek to identify the precise type of
ambiguity that could most usefully facilitate bias acquisi-
tion. Identifying the most appropriate type of ambiguity to
incorporate into CBM-I tasks could be critical to enhancing
the capacity of therapeutic interventions to ameliorate
emotional pathology. There are at least two potentially
critical ways in which ambiguous scenarios may be
resolved. One possibility is that to most effectively alter
interpretive bias, ambiguous scenarios should equally
implicate positive and negative resolutions based on the
initial information provided. This suggests that scenarios
should be constructed such that they build to a concluding
point where there are two critical competing alternatives
that are finally resolved in favour of one meaning. Alter-
natively, it may be that it is more important for the reso-
lution of a scenario to contradict an initially established
expectation. This would instead suggest that the ‘surprise’
value of the ambiguity resolution is important in modifying
biased interpretation, as may be implicated by studies that
have sought to explicitly target reappraisals of negative
events or cognitions (Lang et al. 2009; Woud et al. 2012).
While it is possible that either type of disambiguation could
be equally effective in altering patterns of selective interpre-
tation, there is evidence that the resolution of different types of
ambiguity may implicate different neurocognitive systems.
Research examining the neurocognitive mechanisms involved
in the resolution of ambiguity have sought to systematically
manipulate the point in a spoken sentence where ambiguous
material is resolved (Rodd et al. 2012). Findings also suggest
that different cortical regions may be associated with the
disambiguation of spoken sentences at different stages (Rodd
et al. 2012). That different types of ambiguity register in
discrete neurocognitive regions underscores the possibility
that alternative types of ambiguity and their resolution may
have a different impact the acquisition of interpretive bias.
Future research could therefore usefully serve to establish
whether interpretive training scenarios which initially equally
implicate either positive or negative outcomes prior to their
resolution, or if those resolutions which disconfirm an initially
established expectation serve to most effectively modify
interpretive bias and emotional vulnerability.
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While such future research will obviously be required to
determine the most effective type of ambiguity that will
serve to alter interpretive bias, the results of the present
study clearly support the conclusion that the presence of
ambiguity in imagery-based CBM-I is critical to modifying
patterns of selective interpretation. The absence of group
differences in selective interpretation for those exposed to
scenarios where emotional ambiguity is absent suggests
that the act of merely imagining various positive (or neg-
ative) events is unlikely to alter interpretive bias and
underscores the importance of preserving such ambiguity
in tasks seeking to modify interpretive bias. Thus it seems
that no amount of imagining sunshine, lollipops and rain-
bows will be sufficient to alter biased interpretation unless
ambiguity is present.
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